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Why Elsevier’s Outrageous Profit Margins Could Turn 
Out to Be a Good Thing* 
 





It is routinely report that Elsevier’s profit margins approach 40%.  Here are just a few 
examples. 
 
Last year [2014] the company achieved revenues of ₤2bn and an 
operating profit of 34 per cent — almost four times the average profit 
margin of groups in the FTSE 100. That makes Elsevier the biggest and 
most profitable divisions of RELX, the London-listed Anglo-Dutch 
information group that has a market value of ₤25bn.1 
 
In 2016, Elsevier accounted for 34% of the revenues of RELX group 
(₤2.320 billion of ₤6.895 billion). In operating profits, it represented 40% 
(₤853 million of ₤2,114 million). Adjusted operating profits (with constant 
currency) rose by 2% from 2015 to 2016.2 
 
As one might expect, the consolidation of the publishing industry led to an 
increase of the profits of publishers. Fig 7 presents, as an example, the 
evolution of Reed-Elsevier’s profits over the 1991–2013 period, for the firm 
taken as a whole as well as for its Scientific, Technical & Medical division. 
One can clearly see in Fig 7A that, between 1991 and 1997, both the 
profits and the profit margin increased steadily for the company as a 
whole. While profits more than doubled over that period—from 665M USD 
to 1,451M USD—profit margin also rose from 17% to 26%. Profit margins 
decreased, however, between 1998 and 2003, although profits remained 
relatively stable. Absolute profits as well as the profit margin then rose 
again, with the exception of the 2008–2009 period of economic crisis, 
resulting in profits reaching an all-time high of more than 2 billion USD in 
2012 and 2013. The profit margin of the company’s Scientific, Technical & 
Medical division is even higher (Fig 7B). Moreover, its profits increased by 
a factor of almost 6 throughout the period, and never dropped below 30% 
from one year to another. The profit margin of this division never 
decreased below 30% during the period observed, and steadily increased 
from 30.6% to 38.9% between 2006 and 2013.3 
 
                                                      
* This paper extends the arguments of an earlier work, David W. Lewis, “The Scholarly 
Article is Rebar,” May 2016 https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/handle/1805/9637 
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These profit margins are generally considered outrageous, and they are.  There could 




Elsevier is big — Wikipedia says that in 2016 they employed 7,200 people in 70 offices 
in 24 countries.  That year they published 420,000 articles in 2,500 journals.4  
Increasingly they provide what Elsevier refers to as “digital solutions” that complement 
and enhance this content.  These include clinical decision support systems, Scopus, 
SciVal, Mendeley, Pure, and many more.  Many of Elsevier’s products are monopoly 
goods and this gives them the ability to extract excessive amounts of money from 
universities and anyone else who needs the content they control.  They take no 
prisoners in dealing with anyone who gets in their way, including their customers, as 
their behavior in the recent Louisiana State University suit demonstrates.5  As noted 
above, they make a ton of money.  A key component of Elsevier’s money-making 
strategy — its business model — is their ability to generate high margins.   
 
In most circumstances, the capacity to generate high margins would be an asset, and 
up to now for Elsevier this has certainly been the case.  I want to argue that while the 
capacity to generate high margins has allowed Elsevier to make a lot of money, going 
forward it will make it increasingly difficult to compete in the scholarly journal market.  I 
base this argument on the work of Clayton Christensen.  Christensen argues that 
organizations inevitably develop business models and that the business model, once 
established, is difficult, if not impossible, to change.  It is useful to quote him at length: 
 
Business models are comprised of four interdependent elements.... They 
start with a value proposition: a product or service that helps customers do 
a job that they have been trying to do more effectively, conveniently, and 
affordably. The organization must assemble the set of resources to deliver 
that value proposition—such as people, products, technologies, 
equipment, and facilities. As the organization repeatedly uses its 
resources to deliver its value proposition, processes—habitual ways of 
getting recurrent things done—coalesce. Soon a profit formula emerges 
as the company follows these processes to use its resources to deliver the 
value proposition. The profit formula defines how large the company must 
become to break even, what kind of gross and net margins it must achieve 
to cover the cost of its resources, and how rapidly it needs to turn its 
assets over to achieve an adequate return on investment. The profit 
formula in turn determines the kinds of value propositions that the 
business model can and cannot offer.  These four elements of a business 
model become interdependently locked very quickly. Innovations that 
conform to the business model are readily funded. Organizations 
sometimes reject an innovation that emerges to address a new need in 
the market, but doesn’t t these four elements of the business model. But 
the organization more frequently co-opts such innovations by forcing them 
to conform to the business model in order to get funded. When this 
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happens—funding only flows to innovations that sustain or fit the business 
model—the organization loses its ability to respond to fundamental 
changes in the markets that it serves.6 
 
Christensen argues that in stable times the business model is key to success.  
However, in unstable times or when confronting a disruptive innovation, the business 
model limits what an organization can do and how it can respond.  The available 
responses are only those that can be accommodated within the business model, 
including profit formula. 
 
I have previously argued that Gold Open Access is a disruptive innovation.7  I predict 
that it will disrupt subscription based journal publishers and become the dominant model 
for the scholarly journal literature.  While the evidence is far from complete, I believe 
there are many indications that I am correct.8 
 
 
If I am correct that scholarly journal publishing is being disrupted, and if Christensen is 
correct in what he says about business models and how they limit organizational 
response, we would expect to see predictable responses from Elsevier and the other 
large subscription-based scholarly journal publishers.  Elsevier has a profit formula 
which generates profit margins approaching 40%.  Margins of at this level will become 
impossible in more and more of the scholarly journal market.  In many parts of the 
market — the humanities, for example — margins at this level were never possible.  
Elsevier never enter this part of the market.  As open access becomes a competitive 
alternative to the established subscription model, there are several ways the established 
firms, including Elsevier can respond.  Christensen would predict that they will first try to 
cram the innovation into their established business model.  We have seen this happen 
with hybrid open access and in the creation of open access journals by the established 
publishers.  These efforts might have some success in the short term, but they are 
unlikely to be able to sustain the high profit margins that Elsevier’s business model 
requires.  It is rarely the case that the legacy firm can compete in a disruptive 
environment for just this reason.  The next response of the established firm is to move 
up market.  Christensen uses the example of the steel industry’s response to the 
disruptive innovation of the minimill to explain how this works.9  Facing a disruptive 
innovation attacking the low end of a product line managers face Christensen’s famous 
“innovator’s dilemma”.  As Christensen puts it the question the manager asks is, 
“Should we invest to protect the least profitable end of our business, so that we can 
retain our least loyal, most price-sensitive customers? Or should we invest to strengthen 
our position in the most profitable tiers of our business, with customers who reward us 
with premium prices for better products?”10  This leads the firm to drop products at the 
low end of the product line and to develop them at the high end. 
We can see this upmarket movement happening.  On its website Elsevier proclaims its 
mission: “Elsevier provides information and analytics that help institutions and 
professionals progress science, advance healthcare and improve performance… 
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Discover our digital solutions combining content with technology to turn information into 
actionable knowledge.”11  Elsevier is no longer simply a journal publisher. Its digital 
solutions are built on journal and similar content, but in most cases, they add very 
expensive systems and are sold to universities or similar organizations.  It is hard to 
know for certain, but it is likely that these products fit into the established Elsevier 
business model with its 40% profit margin.  Elsevier will willingly make the large 
investments developing these systems requires because they fit the established 
business model.  It is easy to see Elsevier developing more products at the high end.  It 
is not clear if they at the same time dropping products at the low end.  This would be 
smaller niche journals with limited circulation.  The Big Deal strategy might provide 
Elsevier some protection from disruption for this part of the market, but if libraries 
abandon the Big Deal, we can expect this to happen.  It is only anecdotal, but recently 
my library was approached by a small scholarly society about hosting their journal on 
our open journal platform.  They did so because their previous publisher could no longer 
make a profit on the journal.  I would expect that we will see this happen more 
frequently as open access erodes the profitability of the scholarly journal market.  The 





I would conclude that open access is disrupting scholarly publishing and that the 
established commercial providers can only respond with products that fit in their 
business model.  For Elsevier, this business model includes their outrageous 40% profit 
margin.  This means Elsevier’s responses are limited.  They cannot, over the long haul, 
compete against a provider that has a different business model, open access in this 
case, and is happy with lower margins.  Elsevier has a lot of money and they can put up 
a good fight if they choose.  But at the end of the day why would they compete against 
open access at the bottom end of the scholarly journal market where margins are low 
and funders mandates and Sci-Hub make it an unprofitable market when they can sell 
Pure or SciVal to universities and custom clinical decision support systems to hospitals 
where there is a good fit to the established business model and that profit margins are 
40%. 
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